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EMH Readings

The Efficient Market Hypothesis is a topic getting ripped apart these days…I thought I’d share the archive of readings I’ve saved over the past year to add to the fun.

and of course,

  • The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)

Here’s a chart of the economy’s flow of funds, from Option ARMageddon: (This chart was also stolen here and here)

slide11

Mortgage payments are still responsible for a substantial portion of the US Debt, but Government borrowing has grown YoY(and will grow more in 2010). This is the phenomenon of crowding out, whereby government spending increases interest rates for the private sector, resulting in a decrease in borrowing (in today’s case, the treasury is competing with the private sector for buyers). Meanwhile, the FED’s statistics likely understate the Treasury’s liabilites:

The Fed only includes publicly held debt when calculating total federal government borrowings, $6.7 trillion at the end of Q1.  This excludes over $4 trillion owed to the Social Security “trust fund.”  More importantly, it excludes $60 trillion of unfunded future liabilities for Medicare and Social Security.

10-Year Note

This has to be the most dislocated 5-day chart ever:

Dislocated 10year 6-4

Hedge fund manipulation anyone?

David Rosenberg, the former chief economist at Merrill Lynch (who recently jumped ship) had a follow up interview on CNBC about his bearish observations of the past month. Here are some points from Zero Hedge’s thorough summary:

On the technicals, Rosie sees a possible break through all the way to 1,200: “That is an observation, not a forecast, by the way. Back when we hit that level last fall, it was a glass-half-empty feeling of being down 20% from the highs; this time around it is a cause for celebrating an 80% move off the lows!”

In the fund flow camp, he points out that after the sideways action for the past three weeks, the break out was precipitated by only the second net 2009 inflow in mutual funds of $12 billion. “The initial source of buying power in March was the dramatic short-covering and pension fund rebalancing.” Now, it is the retail investor keeping the rally alive, as he is transfixed by the cheerleading puppets on CNBC. The vicious cycle would pressure the predominantly bearish fund managers (60% seeing the move off the lows as a bear market rally, and 5% buying into the V-shaped recovery concept) to chase performance, implying high “odds of a further melt-up.”

Indeed, the market technicals make this chart of the S&P 500 look unstoppable:

S&P 500 6-2

The upswings since March have been on high volume (with the declines on relatively lower volume), and the index recently broke through the 200-day moving average, which has been a source of resistance since December 2007.

The market’s valuation on the other hand, is very overbought:

In a nutshell, David doesn’t see the S&P $75 earnings, based on a bond implied 12.5x multiple, as achievable until 2013 at the earliest. And he concludes “Look at this way — we are going to be hard-pressed to see operating EPS much better than $43 this year. A ‘normal’ first-year earnings bounce is 20%, and again this is being generous, but that would leave us with $52 EPS for 2010. We give that prospect very little chance of occurring, and we have some difficulty with the stock market going ahead and pricing in an earnings profile that is likely four or more years away from occurring.

Rationalizing the move upward is almost impossible, since this rally is founded on sentiment derived from the fear of being left behind…By institutional investors! From Minyanville:

Portfolio managers are evaluated based on their performance relative to their benchmark. Most institutional managers are still overweight cash and underweight equities…Perhaps even more importantly, virtually everybody that has cash right now is underperforming on a year-to-date basis. Remember that the S&P 500 started the year at 903…Most of these managers aren’t bullish on the market, but at this point, it doesn’t matter what they think. Getting long equities is a matter of job preservation.

That’s very well put…if they cashed out near the bottom, they have no choice but to chase the rally up. He goes on to point out that institutional fund managers (mutual funds, hedge funds, or general financial advisors) handle a great deal of money, and therefore cannot simply buy or sell all at once – it takes much longer to establish/unwind positions, making their operation less liquid. In essence, the shift in allocation from bonds to equities is moving the market due to the magnitude of the cash flow.

Finally, the long-term fundamentals illustrate a more precarious conviction, since the broader economy doesn’t point to the “green shoots” sprouting too quickly:

The much more ominous questions of unemployment and consumer savings are still on the table, and painting a much bleaker economic bleaker picture. In Rosie’s words: “The really big story is that the fiscal stimulus is assisting in the household balance sheet repair process, but is not really doing much to spur consumer spending — highlighted by the rise in the personal savings rate to a 15-year high of 5.7% from 4.5% in March and zero a year ago — never before has the savings rate risen so far over a 12-month span. Note that the post-WWII high in the savings rate is 14.6% and that is where I believe we are heading. Despite the conventional wisdom, this is highly deflationary.” As for unemployment: “Nothing is as important to the inflation backdrop as the labor market — wages/salaries/benefits are seven times more powerful in determining the corporate pricing structure.” And the labor market, at least until the latest batch of however adjusted data, is not showing any relief whatsoever.

A tug of war between market barometers indeed…

An interesting graphic from Bespoke Investment Group:

Bespoke G7

*Reference to the ‘Dollar Smile’ theory (explained by Macro Man, coined by Morgan Stanley):

One possible explanation is an emerging school of thought that a US recession/quasi-recession is actually good for the dollar. According to the proponents of this theory, weak/negative US growth is both damaging to the rest of the world and a catalyst to encourage US investors to bring money back home. The upshot is that there is less demand for foreign assets/currencies and more demand for US assets/currency; hence, the dollar rallies.

By gauging the sentiment of news flow in the past week, the answer to the question of continued strength in the Dollar would seem to be no. First, a little history:

The dollar picked up steam back in December once the thesis that the world economy could “decouple” from the woes of the US fell apart — it became clear that the BRIC economies are less equipped to deal with fallout from the credit crisis, and are more likely to default on their own debts. As stated above, this led investors to unwind their investments in emerging markets, and bring them back into US cash (a more liquid asset). Since stocks were tanking, coupled with the Federal Reserve’s  intent to suppress interest rates with its various liquidity programs (TARP, TALF), many investors sought safety and bought US bonds — to at least yield some sort of return while on the sidelines. Since March 9th (the recent bottom in equities), there has been a departure from risk aversion, and more investors have sought the same risk they did last summer in commodities and emerging markets.

here’s a chart of the MSCI Brazil index (a basket of stocks which is representative of Brazil’s economy):

EWZ

Here’s how the 10-year note has performed in the same time:

10 Note

Yields have gone up (which means people are selling) while emerging markets are simultaneously attracting new capital. The dollar has also weakened – although slightly – which raises the question of a weaker dollar going forward with rising inflation expectations. Tony Crescenzi has stated that the dollar may slowly relinquish the status of being the world’s leading currency, as the dollar is now 63% of the world’s reserve assets (compared to 70% back in 2002). However when considering alternatives (particularly China) he says:

China’s renminbi is ascending but not suitable for parking the world’s reserve assets because there is no bond market there. Moreover, the renminbi is not yet widely used for commerce and in contracts.

Well, Tony may have spoken too soon.

From the Financial Times:

Brazil and China will work towards using their own currencies in trade transactions rather than the US dollar, according to Brazil’s central bank and aides to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president.

An official at Brazil’s central bank stressed that talks were at an early stage. He also said that what was under discussion was not a currency swap of the kind China recently agreed with Argentina and which the US had agreed with several countries, including Brazil.

“Currency swaps are not necessarily trade related,” the official said. “The funds can be drawn down for any use. What we are talking about now is Brazil paying for Chinese goods with reals and China paying for Brazilian goods with renminbi.” (Emphasis Added)

FT Brazil Exports China 5-19

The scale of the agreement wouldn’t be enough to dramatically affect the FX markets, but it could if this idea appeals to other foreign countries. Brazil has discussed selling 10 and 30 year bonds in International markets this year, which would add to the currency’s liquidity…which satisfies another trait of a desirable currency.

As many of the world’s economies embrace foreign investment (Malaysia’s FX market is currently closed to outsiders, for example), and as our domestic economy releverages money from this period of zero interest, the dollar may wear a frown sooner than expected.

Naked Short Sales

This chart from the NYT adds credibility to the SEC’s wild-goose chase from last year:

naked-short-sellingIn case you forgot, there were many people who blamed naked short sales – or shorting a stock without borrowing the shares – for the precipitous decline in shares of financial institutions this past fall. As the graph shows, there have been fewer failed trades since the temporary ban on short sales. Here’s why naked shorting is so controversial:

Naked short-selling can save a trader the costs of borrowing shares, or can make it possible to short a stock where borrowing is very difficult because so many others want to sell it short. A large number of fails does not prove naked short-selling, since there are other reasons for trades to fail, but such a number does indicate it is likely.

It looks like the trading arena is on the road to recovery. There’s an ideology developing where the SEC should tax trades to depress volatility — which would probably put a lot of people out of work.

From Portfolio:

Such a tax could make the markets better. Financial markets raise capital for new enterprises. They help people exchange assets and information. But just because there is higher volume doesn’t mean these trades are expressing more views. Instead, all that is happening is that the bandwagon is speeding up. The faster it goes, the more people want to get on. Noise traders drive out the fundamental investors.

The full article brings up some good points.

Tim Geithner’s replacement, William Dudley, offered some interesting remarks on the effectiveness of TALF, the expansion of the FED’s balance sheet, and alternative methods of providing liquidity to banks. Above all, Dudley stresses that while deleveraging is inevitable in a credit crunch, it is imperative to facilitate the volatility which comes with it:

In the current crisis, the deleveraging process at times has been very violent and dangerous, with powerful reinforcing feedback loops intensifying the process. During these episodes, bystanders who did not engage in excess may be trampled and fail. This may exacerbate the tightening in financial conditions, intensifying the constraint on credit availability and the downward pressure on economic activity.

We saw that happen to Lehman Brothers…

I specifically like his analysis of how deleveraging occurs, and why it has been central in reinforcing our tight predicament – although it’s a term tossed around endlessly by the media, the effects of deleveraging are seldom explained:

For example, in March 2008, in the run-up to Bear Stearns’ demise, the deleveraging process intensified. Market volatility increased; this caused lenders to increase the haircuts they assessed against collateral to secure their lending. The higher haircuts, in turn, squeezed highly leveraged investors who were forced to sell assets. This drove down asset prices and increased price volatility further, leading to still-higher haircuts. This intensified the deleveraging process, which led to more mark-to-market losses.

“Haircuts” effect margin requirements and collateral levels, and ultimately have to do with the dealer’s profit margin; if the dealer demands a greater cushion to execute a trade, the burden is passed to the buyer (e.g. a hedge fund).

If interested, here’s the full transcript of NY Fed President Dudley’s speech.

Adding up the Bailout

From CNN Money:

adding-up-rescue-dollars

I encourage you to follow the link, since there’s a nice interactive chart. According to CNN’s calculations, we’ve spent $2.6 trillion of the $10.5 trillion we’ve allocated to the bailout. This now dwarfs one of my earlier posts on the cumulative cost of the Iraq War.

Finally! This issue has been neglected by the media…to think it only took George Soros to speak up about it.

from Bloomberg:

Billionaire investor George Soros said U.S. commercial real estate will probably drop at least 30 percent in value, causing further strains on banks.

“Commercial real estate has not yet fallen in value,” Soros, 78, speaking at a forum in Washington, said. “It is inevitable, it is written, everybody knows it, there are already some transactions which reflect and anticipate it, so we know, they will drop at least 30 percent.”

Soros said the risk of further declines in property prices is reason for the administration of President Barack Obama to move quickly to recapitalize banks. Soros said Obama acted too slowly on a banking overhaul and should have moved immediately upon taking office.

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